Rationality, Autonomy and Coordination: the Sunk Costs Perspective by Bonifacio, Matteo et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY 
OF TRENTO 
 DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 
  
38050 Povo – Trento (Italy), Via Sommarive 14 
http://www.dit.unitn.it 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RATIONALITY, AUTONOMY AND COORDINATION:  
THE SUNK COSTS PERSPECTIVE  
 
 
Matteo Bonifacio, Paolo Bouquet,  
Roberta Ferrario, and Diego Ponte  
  
 
 
 
 
 
2002 
 
Technical Report # DIT-02-0067 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
Rationality, Autonomy and Coordination: the
Sunk Costs Perspective
Matteo Bonifacio1, Paolo Bouquet1, Roberta Ferrario1, and Diego Ponte1
University of Trento
Via Belenzani, 12 – I-38100 Trento, Italy
bonifacio@itc.it, bouquet@dit.unitn.it, ferrix@cs.unitn.it, ponte@itc.it
Abstract. Our thesis is that an agent1 is autonomous only if he is ca-
pable, within a non predictable environment, to balance two forms of
rationality: one that, given goals and preferences, enables him to select
the best course of action (means-ends), the other, given current achieve-
ments and capabilities, enables him to adapt preferences and future goals.
We will propose the basic elements of an economic model that should
explain how and why this balance is achieved: in particular we underline
that an agent’s capabilities can often be considered as partially sunk in-
vestments. This leads an agent, while choosing, to consider not just the
value generated by the achievement of a goal, but also the lost value gen-
erated by the non use of existing capabilities. We will propose that, under
particular conditions, an agent, in order to be rational, could be led to
perform a rationalization process of justification that changes preferences
and goals according to his current state and available capabilities. More-
over, we propose that such a behaviour could offer a new perspective on
the notion of autonomy and on the social process of coordination.
1 Rationality in Traditional Theories of Choice
Traditional theories of choice are based upon the paradigm that choosing implies
deciding the best course of action in order to achieve a goal [23]. Goals are gen-
erally considered as given or, at least, they are selected through an exogenous
preference function which assigns an absolute value to each possible state of the
world [21]. Potential goals, once ordered according to preferences, are selected
by comparing each absolute value with the cost of its achievement. In particular,
the agent will commit to the goal that maximizes the difference between the ab-
solute benefit of the goal and the cost of using the capabilities that are needed.
This means-ends paradigm subtends a type of rationality that March defines
as anticipatory, causative, consequential, since an agent anticipates the conse-
quences of his actions through a knowledge of cause-effect relationships [7] [18].
Here, as underlined by Castelfranchi, autonomy is viewed in the restrictive sense
of executive autonomy : the only discretionality the agent possesses is about the
1 In this paper we do not intentionally draw any distinction between artificial and
human agents, but we rather discuss the concept of agent in general.
way in which a goal is to be achieved and not about which kind of goal should be
preferable; in this sense, even if an agent selects a goal, he is unable to direct the
criteria of the selection. The interest of the agent is always reconducible to the
one of the designer and, as Steels concludes referring to Artificial Agents, “AI
systems built using the classical approach are not autonomous, although they
are automatic . . . these systems can never step outside the boundaries of what
was foreseen by the designer because they cannot change their own behaviour in
a fundamental way.” [28]. Sometimes, as we will propose, autonomy and ratio-
nality lie in the possibility to change our mind on what is good and what is bad
on the basis of current experience; basically, this is equivalent to the possibility
to decide not just how to achieve a goal, but rather which goal is to achieve and,
moreover, which is preferable.
2 Another Perspective on Rationality: Ex-post
Rationalization
Another way to look at rationality, that March defines as ex-post rationality or
rationalization offers an opposite perspective on decision making [19]. At the
extreme, it envisions an agent as somebody who first acts and then justifies his
actions defining appropriate goals and preferences in order to be consistent to his
current achievements. More realistically, it presents an agent not as somebody
who is only able to be rational in the sense of setting appropriate courses of
action, but also in the sense of changing his mind about what is preferable when
planned achievements become unrealistic [20]. Such an agent is able to learn
not just in terms of finding better ways to achieve a goal but also in terms
of finding goals that are more appropriate to his capabilities. As we will see
afterwards, in an environment characterized by a non predictable evolution, an
agent who has a partial and perspective view of the world [4] [15] will often come
to situations in which ex-post rationalization is more rational than setting a plan
for the achievement of given goals [21]. We will propose that this process hides
an economic principle of reuse and conservation that could lead an agent to try
to fit the world, rather than pretending the world to be appropriate to him.
Moreover, if non predictability is the main reason to be rational and au-
tonomous in the sense just stated, ex post rationalization is also an opportunity
for the agent to be like this. In particular, whenever an environment is ambigu-
ous and undefined, equally ambiguous and undefined is the definition of what
is good and what is bad. More simply, we often describe a situation as good
or bad not because it is so in itself, but rather because of our interpretation
and our convenience; as commonly said, it is a question of perspective [9]. Here
“rationalization” appears as an opportunity, since it can hide a powerful tool to
learn from experience, which produces as outcome the possibility of seeing the
world from different perspectives. As underlined by [21], this view represents de-
cisions as constructive interpretations, since they “are often reached by focusing
on reasons that justify the selection of one option over another. Different frames,
contexts, and elicitation procedures highlight different aspects of the options and
bring forth different reasons and considerations that influence decisions”. More
simply, thanks to rationalization, an agent can understand that, under a differ-
ent point of view, a mistake or an unlucky event could become an opportunity
to learn. In this sense the “value” of a goal appears to be a choice rather than
an evidence [18].
3 The Rationale of Rationalization: Sunk Costs,
Economies of Scale and Irreversibility
In this work we propose that ex-post rationalization can find a rational jus-
tification in the sunk cost effect which derives from the co-occurrence of two
conditions that could characterize an agent’s capability: economies of scale and
irreversibility. To start, an agent has a set of means that we can view both as
capabilities when used to perform actions and as resources when used to de-
velop or acquire new capabilities. Under this perspective, at a given moment, an
agent’s set of capabilities can be interpreted as the result of an investment of
resources. Traditional theories of choice assume that the value of an investment
(that generates an agent’s capability) is realized in its use and, in general, when
calculating the costs of a decision, we consider just those that refer to currently
used capabilities [17].
The observation of the process of decision shows something different. In par-
ticular:
– when calculating the cost of a decision, we consider not just the cost of
those capabilities that we use, but also the cost generated by the non use of
some other one. This is because the generation of a capability implies the
sustenance of some fixed costs that can be amortized through its repeted use.
In fact, in presence of fixed costs, reuse implies a decrease in the unitary cost
of each reutilization. In economic theory, this effect is called the economies
of reuse effect. Consequently, not using a resource implies a loss of value
generated by the lost opportunity of a cost saving. In other words, each time
we use a capability we exploit its economies of reuse effect and at the same
time we loose the correspondent effect of those we do not use.
– each capability, when considered as a resource that can be used to acquire
another capability, displays a rate of irreversibility. This is because when
trying to transform it into another, we can sustain a loss in value if the
resource is difficult to manipulate or if it is difficult to find a buyer on the
market. In general, if a resource is totally reversible (for example currency),
it can be sold on the market and the economies of reuse effect has only
marginal impact on the decision of the agent. On the other hand, if totally
irreversible, the resource will completely display its economies of reuse effect;
if this is not used, its owner will suffer the loss of potential cost saving [10].
In all these cases, a resource which is characterized both by economies of
reuse and a rate of irreversibility is considered a sunk cost and it generates the
effect that “paying for the right to use a good will increase the rate at which the
good will be utilized ceteris paribus” [30]. This hypothesis will be referred to as
the sunk cost effect [2]2 and, as underlined by [24], “This tendency (the sunk
cost consideration) contradicts a basic principle in economics that past costs and
benefits should be irrelevant to current decisions [13]”. In [17] Johnstone writes:
“For decision-making purposes, sunk costs are strictly irrelevant. This is a law
of economic logic justified by the argument that because no action (current or
future) can avert or reduce a sunk cost, no sunk cost can be attributed to or
have any relevance to current or future action. It is evident, however, that for
many of us, the edict that sunk costs be ignored is hard to accept, if not as
a matter of logic then at least in application”3. It is common sense that each
resource displays some of these effects, generating on the one hand an incentive
to reuse and, on the other, an incentive to create markets to enhance reversibility.
Moreover, it is important to notice how such effects can affect decisions. In fact,
when deciding, an agent will consider not just the costs currently sustained,
but also those losses in value generated by the non use of sunk investments.
Now the point is that in a non predictable environment, while pursuing a goal,
an agent can be led to develop and acquire capabilities that, to some extent,
have no use in order to achieve this same goal. This is probably in case of very
turbulent environments and it is enhanced when the agent is in an advanced
stage of his life or is particularly experienced in the domain of the decision he is
facing; the former circumstance leads the agent to unforeseen situations and to
the generation of redundant capabilities; the latter to the growing accumulation
of sunk investments and costs, since those that are more reversible were probably
used during the earlier stages of the agent’s life or experience.
4 Generating Preferences and Goals
In this section we will give evidence on how a decision making process that
considers sunk costs, can lead to an ex-post rationalization whereby an agent
manipulates preferences in order to justify his current state. As we will propose,
through this endogenous process of preferences formation, an agent becomes able
to select and pursue goals which are not foreseeable a-priori.
4.1 Generating Preferences
As [14] suggests, the “commitment to a current course of action is a function of
the comparison between the perceived utility of continuing with the action and
the perceived utility of withdrawal and/or changing the action”. If sunk costs are
taken into consideration in determining which option is preferable in a decision,
an agent can face a situation in which the cost of changing his mind about what
2 Some authors also call this “escalation effect” [25] [26] and it has been applied
in studying political decisions constrained by the presence of sunk costs (such as
military escalation).
3 See also [22] [29].
is preferable is lower than the cost of going on in the pursuit of his intentions. In
particular, in the decision function the weight of sunk costs overcomes the one of
current opportunities. Some authors have remarked that this tendency can lead
to irrational behaviours such as the “irrational escalation” [26], whereby social
agents could irrationally justify the current failure in order to explain past choices
and “save their face” [5]. In this sense, decisions generating investments influence
future choices that are constrained by the need to preserve past investments. On
the other hand, some other has remarked that such a behaviour is also to be
considered as a manifestation of coherence and rationality [11]. In fact, seen the
other way round, (i.e. as a rational behaviour), such a situation offers the agent
the opportunity to do something qualitatively different: instead of reasoning on
how to pursue an unrealistic goal, he could realistically consider his current state
as appropriate to his capabilities. In this case, a current unexpected situation
could be viewed by the agent as a proper ex-post goal, and remaining where he
is could be more rational than moving. As argued before, instead of reasoning
about means necessary to achieve ends which were shown to be irrational, he
rationalizes his current state as an end which is appropriate to his means. Under
this perspective, the sunk cost effect is an attempt to demonstrate the rationality
of behaviours that are otherwise not explained and thus labelled as “irrational”
by traditional theories of rationality 4. We suggest that this attitude leads to a
process of retrospective self-justification [27] that implies a change in preferences.
In fact, in order to be consistent with his history, an agent who rationalizes his
current state needs to change his preferences accordingly. As a matter of fact, in
order to justify the (even ex-post) adoption of a goal, a rational agent needs to
express such a goal as desirable. If not, the agent would display the inconsistent
behaviour of choosing a goal which is not desirable. This necessity leads the
agent to invert his reasoning process on preferences which are turned from fixed
tools used to select goals to variable matters that are adapted to (now fixed)
current achievements. As clearly stated by [11], “When people realize they are in
situations that they have never considered before, they do not judge themselves
to be irrational. Instead, they simply try to decide what beliefs and preferences
to adopt (if any)”. In other words, it is rational for the agent to perform a
counterfactual process [12] [16] that could be expressed by a sentence such as:
“What should I have preferred in order to be satisfied with the state of the world
I am currently in?” or “What should I have preferred in order to desire to reach
a goal that is consistent with the current state of the world?”.
4.2 Generating Goals
As anticipated, through this counterfactual process, the agent asks himself which
goal he should have been committed to in order to be, given his resources/capabilities,
satisfied with what he currently is. In a particular sense, such a process repre-
sents the first attempt for an agent to endogenously generate a goal; the goal is
4 In this sense, for example, [3] argued that the escalation effect, which is typically
adducted as an example of irrational course of action, stems from a “don’t waste”
decision rule (see also [1]).
the already achieved current state that, only ex-post, can be viewed as a goal.
That is to say, we propose that the first manifestation of goal autonomy is the
rationalization of an unexpected and undesired current state, turned into a de-
sired one. Since rationalization is exactly driven by sunk costs, this first goal,
by definition, will display the peculiarity of exploiting the value of current sunk
investments. We underline that this original process of goal and preferences cre-
ation is not an abstract process of imagining new possible worlds and preferences
but a concrete exercise that uses the presence of a goal (the current state) as a
tool to derive a proper set of preferences.
At a first sight, the behaviour of this agent could appear to be intrinsically
conservative. Once the weight of past investments overcomes the weight of imme-
diate value, the agent stops where he is, due to the retrospective justification of
his state as a desired one. Even if we think that, in time, conservative behaviours
are an underlying tendency of the agent, we propose that, within this tendency,
new deliberative behaviours can emerge. Here we give just an example of how
new goals can emerge, derived by the idea of Castelfranchi [8] of social adoption.
In fact, given the new set of preferences, the agent is now able to assign new
“values” to every state of the world that is accessible to his knowledge. In this
way an agent is able to reorder the states of the world on his new preference
scale and set new goals. On the other hand, he has now changed his beliefs on
means-ends relations and on how a particular set of capabilities (the ones used
to reach the current state) can be used in order to achieve a goal. In particular,
he changes his beliefs on what is preferable and on which means are needed in
order to get to a particular goal (the current state) [11]. For example, we might
argue that the agent, observing other agent’s situations, discovers that another
state of the world displays a net benefit (considering the new preferences and
existing sunk costs) which is higher than the one of preserving the current state.
Now he will adopt the new possible state as the new goal. Again, as above, this
process can lead to the acquisition of new resources and to the possibility that,
on the path to the goal, the agent happens again to be in unexpected states of
the world that might influence, through the evaluation of sunk investments, his
preferences.
5 Conclusions: Autonomy and Coordination
This conclusion leads us to some considerations on the notion of autonomy. We
agree with the one proposed by Castelfranchi [6] whereby an agent is autonomous
if he is able to choose goals on the basis of a personal interest. Here we underline
the need that such interest is an endogenous production of the agent rather than
something exogenously given by a designer (in the case of artificial agents) or by
another human or metaphysical entity (in the case of human agents). Moreover,
Castelfranchi remarks that the definition of autonomy currently used in artificial
agents literature is referable to the weaker notion of executive autonomy (as
opposed to goal autonomy): an agent is autonomous if he is able to choose
among alternative courses of action. As he underlines, this kind of autonomy
could resolve both in a type of slavery (from some external utility function) and
in a form of irrationality (pursuing some other’s interest when this is conflicting
with our own is irrational). We strongly believe as Castelfranchi in the idea
that an agent, if not goal autonomous, is not autonomous at all and, moreover,
potentially irrational. Now the question becomes how such a type of autonomy
can emerge in order to design, if possible, agents that can display goal autonomy
through the generation of endogenous preferences and the consequent adoption
of non a-priori foreseeable goals. In this work, we sketch the lines of a model that
could give an answer. In particular our thesis is that an agent, in order to be
rational, endogenously develops preferences and goals that are consistent to his
“emerging” interest. This interest is the consequence of an unforeseen evolution
of his life that led to the generation of sunk costs that need to be considered in
decision making. Such an evolution, assuming a non predictable environment,
leads to the autonomous formation of preferences that are not foreseeable a-
priori, and that are the rational consequence of an economic principle of reuse.
Through preference formation, new goals become desirable while old ones are
abandoned. In this sense we say that the agent, at a certain stage of his life, in
order to be rational, needs to become autonomous (and form new preferences).
One last point addresses the way in which this approach could be used to
interpret some fundamental aspects of an agent’s sociality, in particular those
aspects that involve coordination with other agents. Specifically, if we consider
coordination efforts as investments that display a sunk cost effect, we can explain
the persistency of social relations. We refer to the observation that social rela-
tions among social agents are less prone to opportunism than what is predicted
by traditional utilitaristic theories. In fact, whenever the current value of a rela-
tion is lower than the cost of keeping it, an agent should break such relation. As
a matter of fact, social relations seem to be more persistent than this. A way to
interpret such persistency without recurring to exogenous factors (such as social
norms) [8], is provided by the perspective of sunk costs. Here a social relation-
ship is viewed as a resource and capability that displays an economies of reuse
effect (as a consequence of the initial investment in creating the relation) and a
rate of irreversibility (since a social relationship cannot always be transformed
into another). As a consequence, an agent, in order to achieve his goal, will tend
to reuse and justify current established relations before creating new ones.
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